1956

Posted by Jew from Jersey
18 October 2022

If you were to have asked any intelligent, educated, informed person at any time in the first half of the twentieth century about the prospects for a Jewish state in Palestine, you would probably have heard something like the following answer given by a character in a story published in 1935:

The country which you have come to inherit is an inhabited land. Beyond your doors stands a mighty Arab National Movement which also strikes its roots in this country as well as in all those others inhabited by Arabs. You will not be able to stand against them. The [British] government will not support you. It is afraid of the Arabs. Nor is there any hope in the support of Europe; Christendom has not forgotten its ancient hatred of you. These are the external obstacles, and the internal ones are not less serious. The country is not and cannot be made suitable for industry. It will remain suitable only to agriculture, and in that profession you lack all ability and experience and will never succeed. (from Palestine Caravan by Moshe Smilansky)

If you had asked such a person at that time or even later about the future of Rhodesia, the answer would probably have been the complete opposite. Rhodesia’s prospects looked excellent. Rhodesia had governed itself since 1923 and had provided for itself. Unlike other British territories in Africa, Rhodesia had cost the British taxpayer nothing. Rhodesians of all races had fought in disproportionately high numbers in Britain’s wars. After WWII, Britain had put Rhodesia in charge of the newly created Central African Federation, a sure sign that it was grooming the country for independence and had full faith in the Rhodesian model. All of Rhodesia’s former enemies had long since ceased to be threatening. The Boer Republics had agreed to join the Union of South Africa, a country of the British Commonwealth. Rhodesia now had good relations with the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. Rhodesia’s own native population had been quiescent since 1897 and had advanced greatly since then in education and economic attainment. Surely they were appreciative and looked to the white government for leadership. What’s more, franchise in Rhodesia had always been limited by money and literacy, not by color. Soon black people would attain the franchise in greater numbers and have a real say in the politics of the country. Rhodesia would set the high standard for race relations just as it had for everything else. Rhodesians were knowledgeable and prosperous farmers. Rhodesian industry was booming. The capital of Southern Rhodesia, Salisbury, known for its well-kept streets and leafy neighborhoods, was now the federal capital and rapidly becoming one of the richest and most important cities on the continent. The country was at peace, proud of its accomplishments, and poised for greatness in every sphere, a real light unto the nations in Africa.

Yet in subsequent decades, prospects for the two countries were to go in precisely the opposite directions with Israel morphing into a regional power in the Middle East and Rhodesia stranded as an anachronism in Africa, a dead man walking. The inflection point for this reversal of fortunes was 1956 and the pivotal event that year was the “Suez Crisis” as it was known in the British sphere of influence. In Israel, which by that time was no longer part of the British sphere of influence, it was known as “Operation Kadesh” or “Operation Sinai.” Even though Israel and Britain fought on the same side in this conflict, it was at one and the same time a major victory for Israel, but a major defeat for Britain and what remained of its Empire.

This was the war that put Israel on the map as a country. In 1948, it had fought and won and gained its independence, but that had been regarded as a flash in the pan. It struggled to establish overseas trade and even control over its own borders. After 1956, it dealt with the world powers on its own terms. By rapidly occupying the entire Sinai Peninsula that year and only relinquishing it when Egypt appealed to the United Nations for a resolution, Israel proved it had staying power. The subsequent demilitarization of the Sinai under U.N. supervision gave Israel the freedom of navigation through the Red Sea it had sought and also ended the cross-border attacks from Egypt that had been endemic since the early 1950s. All this led to broad social and economic development in Israel over the following decade, setting the stage for even greater military victory in 1967.

Israeli Shermans in 1956. Rhodesia would never have armor like this, nor the kind of clout to invade neighboring countries on this scale.

In 1948, Britain had been on the side of Egypt against Israel. In early 1949, it had used its own RAF warplanes to stop victorious Israeli forces from pursuing the retreating Egyptian army into the Sinai. Now, less than six years later, Britain was asking Israel for help in dislodging the Egyptians from Suez. Britain could only muster 45,000 troops for the operation. Israel, whose total population at the time was less than two million, raised 175,000 troops. In exchange for its withdrawal from Suez and Sinai, Israel got real security. Britain got nothing. A new realization emerged that Britain could not or would not defend its own interests and was no longer respected by the U.N., the U.S., or its own former dependents like Egypt.

This was the backdrop against which every British territory in Africa and elsewhere began demanding immediate independence. And indeed by 1960, Britain had either granted or promised independence to all of them with few conditions or qualifications. Two of the territories Britain readily acquiesced to give independence to were Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, soon to become the independent African countries of Zambia and Malawi respectively. The fact that both countries had since 1953 been part of the Central African Federation whose constitution did not allow for secession suddenly counted for nothing. The fact that neither territory had a history of self-governance did not matter either.

It soon became clear that it was only Southern Rhodesia — the third member of the Federation and the only one that did have a history of self-governance — that would not be granted independence. The problem was not that Southern Rhodesia had a significant white population. Northern Rhodesia did too. But Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were protectorates. Britain could grant them independence as it saw fit. The whites of Northern Rhodesia could stay or flee willy-nilly once Zambia became independent, just as the whites of Tanganyika, Kenya, and Belgian Congo had fled before them. But Southern Rhodesia was a colony. It had its own constitution and a parliament. Its elected representatives would have to be impressed upon to vote themselves out of existence. While Britain had taken an anything-goes approach everywhere else, with Southern Rhodesia they insisted on compliance.

Britain’s tough talk on Southern Rhodesia in the early 1960s must have seemed like empty bluster. British PM Harold Wilson used wording to threaten Southern Rhodesian PM Ian Smith in 1965 similar to that Anthony Eden had used to threaten Nasser in 1956. This perception of weakness was to prove dangerous. Everyone saw the British as losers. But the whites saw themselves as an extension of the movement towards independence from Britain while the blacks saw the whites as an extension of Britain. This set the stage for a bloody and unwinnable war that was to last almost 20 years.

Queen Elizabeth II in 1956. In her name Eden threatened Nasser and Wilson threatened Smith, with the wrath of “Her Majesty’s Government.” What did she really think of all this?